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Abstract: Recently economists have become interested in why people who face 
social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of 
punishment to deter free riding.  Three theories have evolved to explain 
punishment.  We survey each theory and use behavioral data from surveys and 
experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people 
punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.  We also show 
that social reciprocity can evolve in a population of free riders and contributors if 
the initial conditions are favorable. 
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Economists have become interested in analyzing, in the experimental lab, 
something that has been known to field researchers for quite a while – people 
who face social dilemmas (i.e. situations in which group and individual incentives 
are at odds) control free riding locally by the use of social, economic, and/or 
physical sanctions.
1  The existence of schemes by which people monitor each 
other and punish those who free ride is problematic for standard economic 
theory.  Why?  First, in non-repeated interactions, any theory assuming that 
agents simply want to maximize their material gain can not reconcile the 
cooperative behavior needed to obtain socially efficient outcomes because free 
riders always do better – free riding when others contribute avoids the costs 
associated with contributing yet returns the benefits of cooperation and free 
riding when others free ride prevents one from being taken advantage of.  Hence, 
no selfish person would ever cooperate.  The same argument can also be made for 
not punishing free riders because punishment, in this context, is just a second 
order social dilemma (see Boyd and Richerson [1992]).  Those people who don’t 
punish avoid the costs of doing so, but share any benefits associated with the 
punishment inflicted by others. 
  Recently, three theories have emerged to explain why players punish free 
riders in social dilemma games.  In this paper we explain each theory and use 
data from experiments and surveys to evaluate their behavioral relevance.  The 
common starting point for each theory is the fact that punishing behaviors are 
grounded in evolutionary theory to provide them with microfoundations.   
However, the theories differ in the degree to which punishment is believed to be a 
purposeful act versus a normative response. 
  Price et al. [forthcoming], hereafter PCT, have developed a theory to 
explain why people punish free riders.  Their theory, which we will call the 
fitness differential theory, differs from standard economic theory because 
behavior is allowed to evolve based on payoff or fitness differentials.  In practice, 
                                                 
1  Economic  punishment experiments include Fehr and Gaechter [2000], Bowles et al. 
[2001], Carpenter [2001], Carpenter et al. [2001], Page and Putterman [2000], and Sefton 
et al. [2000].  Relevant field research is summarized in Ostrom [1990] and Ostrom et al. 
[1994].  A specific example of field research is Acheson [1988]. evolutionary models often predict different outcomes from standard economic 
models because the evolutionary equilibrium selection mechanism is less 
restrictive.  Specifically, non-subgame perfect behavior can be the limit point of 
an evolutionary process (a la Gale et al. [1995]).  The basic premise of the fitness 
differential theory is the seemingly obvious assertion (as PCT point out) that no 
pro-social behavior can evolve in a population of free riders unless cooperative 
types somehow recover or eliminate the benefits of free riding.
2  Therefore,   
punishment, according to PCT, evolves to tax away the benefits accruing to free 
riders. 
There are two other theories not based explicitly on removing free riders’ 
fitness advantage that can explain punishment.  Both of these theories are based 
on the notion of reciprocity which requires people to reciprocate the costs 
imposed by free riders by punishing them.  Reciprocal behaviors are similar in 
phenotype to the behavior posited by PCT (free riders are punished and their 
fitness is reduced), but the reasons for acting are different.  People motivated to 
reduce fitness differentials are outcome-oriented while, we believe, reciprocators 
respond to the violation of an obvious norm or rule. 
One reciprocity-based theory, originating in Gintis [2000],  shows that a 
behavior called strong reciprocity, which is a predisposition to cooperate and 
punish free riding within well-defined groups, can evolve when group selection is 
permitted.  A second alternative, which we call social reciprocity (see Carpenter 
et al. [2001]) generalizes the notion of strong reciprocity to account for 
cooperation and punishment in the sort of large, amorphous, groups that 
constitute neighborhoods, for example.  We devote the rest of this paper to 
assessing how well each theory explains the behavioral data. 
 
Problems with the Fitness Differential Theory in Mutual Monitoring 
Environments 
 
We define a mutual monitoring regime as a system by which people who face 
social dilemmas in a group with well-defined membership identify and sanction 
                                                 
2 It is not actually true that free rider benefits need to be taxed away for cooperation to 
evolve.  For example, assortative interactions allow for the evolution of cooperation by 
restricting access to the gains from cooperation. free riders.
3  The first question we ask is – How well does the fitness differential 
theory predict punishment in mutual monitoring experiments?   
  To assess the fitness differential theory we will review the data from an 
experiment reported on in Carpenter et al. [2001].  In the mutual monitoring 
game, participants are given an endowment of 25 experimental monetary units, 
EMUs, and given the choice of contributing to a public good or keeping the 
EMUs for themselves.  Each contribution returns 0.5 EMUs for all the members 
of the four-person group which implies that contributing is socially efficient 
because each contributed EMU returns 2 EMUs to the group.  However, each 
participant can do better by never contributing because free riders receive 0.5 
EMUs per contribution regardless of how much they contribute. 
  After the contribution stage, players are shown the (anonymous) 
contributions decisions of the other members of their group and are allowed to 
punish them.  Punishment is costly.  Players spend 1 EMU per sanction and each 
sanction reduces the target’s payoff by 2 EMUs. 
  Instead of declining steadily as usually happens in this sort of choice 
environment (see Ledyard [1995]), when punishment is allowed, contributions 
typically start at approximately half the endowment and grow to an average of 
70% of the endowment by the end of eight periods.
4   
  According to the fitness differential theory, which states that cooperators 
should punish free riders to reduce their payoff advantage, when looking at the 
punishment data we should see a strictly downward sloping relationship between 
contributions to the public good and the punishment assigned.  The more one 
free rides, the larger is that person’s payoff differential, and therefore, the more 
this person should be punished.  What we actually see, i.e. the statistically 
estimated relationship, is given in figure 1.
5 
                                                 
3 Classic examples in economics are team production and the provision of a public good. 
4 However, there is typically an end game effect that happens in the last two periods of 
the game (periods 9 and 10) in which free riding is more frequent, but not punished less. 
5  Because the data is a panel, the regression behind figure one includes time period 
random effects.  Further, the coefficients on both the first and second order regressors are 
highly significant (p<0.01).  Specifically, we get:  
Punishment = 2.12 - 5.22 Contribute + 3.23 Contribute
2+ ε 
                   (0.26) (0.99)                 (0.83) 
with overall R
2 = 0.01, n=3528, and Wald chi-squared = 54.91. Figure 1 here 
  The horizontal axis of figure 1 measures the fraction of one’s endowment 
contributed and the vertical axis measures the estimated punishment for each 
contribution level.  Because the squared contribution term is highly significant 
and large (p<0.01, β=3.23), the expected punishment function turns up near the 
end of the contribution range implying that people who contribute at high levels 
get punished too.  This fact is inconsistent with the fitness differential theory – 
only free riders should be punished.  
  Given figure 1 is inconsistent with a strict reading of the fitness 
differential theory, what happens if we consider a less strict version of the PCT 
theory.  For example, what if we say that contributors punish free riders, but free 
riders also seek revenge and punish contributors.  This modification, more or less, 
still captures the essence of the PCT theory but may be more realistic given 
other demonstrated tendencies toward spitefulness (e.g. Camerer and Thaler 
[1995]).
6 
The first problem with this modification is that we need to assume that 
free riders anticipate being punished by contributors, but a bigger problem is 
that, on average, free riders don’t punish contributors as much as other players 
do.  Who  punishes the contributors?  If we limit our data to the instances in 
which full contributors (i.e. contribute=1) are punished and regress the total 
punishment received by full contributors on the contribution level of the person 
who is doing the punishing, we get the relationship in figure 2.
7 
There is a striking similarity between figures 1 and 2, namely, 
participants can expect to minimize the amount of punishment they receive by 
contributing between 70 and 80 percent of the endowment (figure 1), and the 
people who punish those that contribute everything contribute close to 70 
percent (figure 2) themselves.  On top of this, the average contribution, pooling 
                                                 
6 Also notice that if free riders purposefully seek fitness advantages over contributors then 
punishing contributors may re-establish the fitness differential eliminated by contributor 
punishment (if the cost of punishing is less than the harm inflicted). 
7 Again, we use random effects and get: 
Punishment = 1.34 + 1.19 Punisher’s Contribute – 1.27 Punisher’s Contribute
2+ ε 
                   (0.16)  (0.67)                                (0.71) 
with overall R
2 = 0.04, n=76, and Wald chi-squared = 3.26. 
 across all periods, is approximately 70% of the endowment and we note that the 
mean contribution level of the people who punish full contributors is not 
significantly different from 70% of the endowment (p=0.95).  These facts put the 
fitness differential theory in further doubt because even the modified version 
can’t explain the punishment patterns we see.  Contrary to the fitness differential 
theory, contributors are punished and this behavior can not be explained by free 
riders retaliating against contributors. Instead, players who fully contribute are 
punished by the players who contribute near the norm or average. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
If the fitness differential theory doesn’t explain the data, how can we 
make sense of what happens in this game?  We think that our mutual monitoring 
data is more consistent with strong reciprocity if we are more specific about what 
it means to cooperate.  Judging by the data, contributing fully is not necessarily 
the threshold below which people are determined to be free riders.  Instead, as in 
Fehr and Gaechter [2000] and Bowles et al. [2001], people who deviate from the 
average are the ones who are punished most.  This fact implies that cooperating, 
in this environment, means conforming to the average contribution level and 
therefore a modified story in which strong reciprocators will conform to the 
average and punish people who deviate explains the data rather well.  
  If our modified strong reciprocity hypothesis is true we would also expect 
that the likelihood that someone punishes a free rider will depend on how 
strongly the punisher feels a norm has been violated.  To test whether deviating 
from a norm triggers punishment, we conducted a survey similar to PCT.  In this 
survey, participants answered questions about three vignettes that described a 
team production scenario in which someone free rides. One relevant scenario 
participants reacted to is the following: 
 
You and a number of other newly hired people are employed by an auto 
manufacturer and assigned to work in teams of four.  Everyone on the team is 
paid equally and the pay level is determined entirely by how many cars your work 
team produces.  On the first day of work, you and the other three members of 
your team divide up the production tasks equally.  Over the course of the next 
month, you and two other members of your group work regularly and hard.   
However, the fourth member of the team often hides in a storage room and reads a book instead of working on cars.  This means the other three of you must work 
harder to make the same number of cars as the other four-person teams. At the 
end of the month, you and everyone else in your group earn the same amount of 
money. 
 
We asked the participants the extent to which they agreed or disagreed 
(measured on a 7-point Likert scale) with a number of passages including: 
 




I would confront the non-working team member because I think most people would 
agree that he was breaking an unstated rule to work hard. 
 
  Controlling for the respondent’s gender (β=-0.55, n.s.) and the number of 
economics classes the respondent had taken (β=-0.27, p<0.05), we find a 
significant positive relationship between the extent to which one agrees that free 
riding breaks a work norm and the stated likelihood that one will punish free 
riders (β=0.33, p=0.05).
8  This is further evidence, from a different data source, 
that punishment is triggered by the violation of a norm (i.e. which is consistent 
with our modified version of strong reciprocity) and does not evolve specifically 
as a mechanism to reduce the payoff differential accruing to free riders. 
 
Strong Reciprocity or Social Reciprocity? 
 
In our team production survey we also presented respondents with the following 
scenario: 
 
You and a number of other newly hired people are employed by an auto 
manufacturer and assigned to work in teams of four.  Everyone on the team is 
paid equally and the pay level is determined entirely by how many cars your work 
                                                 
8  Because the responses are measured on an ordinal scale, we used the ordered logit 
procedure for this regression yielding: 
Willingness to Confront = 0.33 Free Rider Breaks Norm – 0.55 Female – 0.27 Econ + ε 
(0.17)                                   (0.51)           (0.13) 
with pseudo R
2 = 0.09, n=70, and chi-squared = 11.61. team produces.  On the first day of work, you and the other three members of 
your team divide up the production tasks equally.  Each of you works equally hard 
making cars.  However, you notice that a member of the group that occupies the 
workspace next to yours often hides in a storage room and reads a book instead of 
working on cars.  While your earnings are unaffected by what this member of the 
other team is doing, the members of his team must work harder and share their 
income with this person. 
 
We again asked the degree to which the respondent would punish the 
free rider and the extent to which free riding was considered a violation of a work 
norm.  Surprisingly, 43% of respondents said they would punish the free rider 
even though, by free riding the person inflicted no harm on the respondent, and 
the respondent could never benefit from punishing because any increase in effort 
would benefit a different work team.  Further, using this scenario we replicated 
the regression results discussed in the previous session.  The coefficient on the 
norm measure is again positive and significant (β=0.45, p<0.05) controlling for 
gender (β=0.74, n.s.) and the number of economics classes taken (β=-0.28, 
n.s.).
9,10 
The results of our second scenario present a problem for both the fitness 
differential theory and strong reciprocity.  Specifically, why would people who 
behave according to the fitness differential theory punish free riders in other 
groups?  The same question presents a problem for strong reciprocity.  The 
theory of strong reciprocity hypothesizes that people punish free riders within 
their group and that groups in which this occurs do better than groups in which 
punishment does not occur because punishing groups elicit more cooperation.   
Punishing outside ones group, if any thing, reduces whatever differential benefit 
punishing groups achieve because punishment is costly and the benefits accrue to 
a different group. 
                                                 
9 The ordered logit procedure in this case yielded: 
Willingness to Confront = 0.45 Free Rider Breaks Norm + 0.74 Female – 0.28 Econ + ε 
(0.20)                                   (0.72)            (0.22) 
with pseudo R
2 = 0.09, n=34, and chi-squared = 6.97. 
10 We also included a third scenario (and balanced the design) which is identical to the 
second except it adds a sentence that states that one can expect the free rider to retaliate 
if confronted.  We call this the high cost scenario.  Again, the relationship between norm 
violation and punishment is significant (β=0.50, p<0.05). To account for punishing outside one’s group, we define social reciprocity 
as the propensity to cooperate and punish deviations from a widely held norm.  
So far, all the data we have presented are consistent with social reciprocity.   
Contributing the average in the mutual monitoring game and punishing 
deviations is the phenotypic expression of social reciprocity within groups.   
Outside groups, social reciprocators also punish free riders who break obvious 
rules like not working. 
  Social reciprocity and strong reciprocity are related concepts.  We view 
social reciprocity as a generalization of strong reciprocity.  One way we might 
make the theoretical link between the two concepts is to imagine that as society 
developed, populations grew, congregated in larger numbers, and group 
membership blurred. In this environment, a simpler heuristic evolved in which 
people conserve on the cognitive costs of evaluating the group membership of free 
riders and simply punished all norm violators.  That is, it is not hard to imagine 
a set of parameters such that when one complicates the strong reciprocity model 
by adding that group membership must be calculated at some cost, but sanctions 
are relatively costless, people who just punish all violators do as well or better. 
 
Social Reciprocity in the Lab 
 
Because we worried that the hypothetical nature of our survey might bias the 
result that people will punish “outgroup”, we ran another public goods 
experiment similar to the mutual monitoring game accept, in the second game 
people could punish outgroup as well as ingroup.  We call this game the social 
reciprocity game.  The game is identical to the mutual monitoring game accept 
now, in the punishment stage, participants saw the contributions of, and could 
punish, all the other players in the session and each session was composed of two 
completely separate groups playing simultaneously. 
  Figure 3 summarizes play in the social reciprocity game.  The vertical 
axis measures two things simultaneously: the fraction of one’s endowment 
contributed to the public good and the fraction of one’s gross earnings spent on 
punishing other players.  The most important thing to notice is that outgroup 
punishment is positive in all ten periods and responds positively to increased free ridership.   On average, players spend 5% of their earnings punishing free riders 
outside their group.
11 
  Observe, too, that allowing outgroup punishment increases contributions.  
Contributions rise not only above the level elicited when no punishment is 
allowed (Standard VCM), but also above the level resulting when participants 
can punish within groups only (Mutual Monitor).  This makes sense because in 
worlds populated by social reciprocators free riders are punished more often and 
more severely which reduces the incentive to free ride.  But again, it is important 
to emphasize that the reason for punishment is not to reduce this differential, or 
increase contributions, it is a byproduct of the enforcement of a pro-social norm. 
Figure 3 here 
But Does Socially Reciprocal Behavior Survive Selection? 
 
So far we have provided a third explanation for why people punish in social 
dilemmas, but we need to prove that such behavior could evolve – that is, can we 
construct microfoundations for social reciprocity?  The answer is yes and the 
microfoundations we provide are a strict test for social reciprocity because we 
don’t use group selection arguments (as in the Gintis [2000] theory of strong 
reciprocity) nor do we change the environment to favor social reciprocity (i.e. 
players do not incur costs to identify ingroup members). 
  Imagine a two person version of the social reciprocity game in which 
players contribute all or nothing to the public good.  The normal form of this 
game appears in figure 4.  As in the experiment, the total endowment of the 
group is 100 EMUs and contributions to the public good return 0.5 EMUs per 
EMU contributed.  Free riding is clearly the dominant strategy when punishment 
is not allowed.  We also match the experiment by letting agents punish each 
other.  At a cost of 1 EMU players can buy a 2 EMU reduction in another 
players payoff.  For simplicity we make both the contribution and punishment 
decisions binary; players contribute all 50 EMUs or none and they spend either 
10 EMUs to punish each free rider or nothing. 
 
 
                                                 
11  Outgroup punishment is significantly positive in each period and directed 
disproportionately at free riders.  See Carpenter et al. [2001] for the details.  Contribute  Free  Ride 
Contribute 75,  75  37.5,  87.5 
Free Ride  87.5, 37.5  50, 50 
 
Figure 4 – A Mini Social Reciprocity Game 
 
 
At each moment in continuous time, nature randomly assigns four people from a 
large population to play the game in two groups of two.  All contribution choices 
are revealed, and then, in a second stage, contributors decide (a) whether to 
punish free riders and, if so, (b) which free riders to punish – ingroup, outgroup, 
or both.
12 We consider five agent types: 
 
(1) Free Riders: don’t contribute and don’t punish. 
(2) Second Order Free Riders: contribute but never punish. 
(3) Strong Reciprocators: contribute and punish ingroup free riders only. 
(4) Pure Social Reciprocators: contribute and punish outgroup free riders                 
only. 
(5) Social Reciprocators: contribute and punish free riders in both 
groups. 
 
We also suppose, for the sake of convenience, that contributors who punish 
cannot “pick and choose”:  a contributor who punishes both in- and outgroup 
players and is matched with three free riders (one ingroup and two outgroup), for 
example, is assumed to punish all three. 
  The mini social reciprocity game has multiple Nash equilibria but a 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium, in which no one contributes and no one 
punishes.  Suppose, however, that participants are “aspiration-based learners” in 
the sense of Gale et al. [1995].  In this case, the evolution of the population 
shares associated with the five pure strategies will follow the normalized 
replicator dynamic: 
 
  ( ),      1,2,3,4,5 ii i pp i ππ =− = !  
 
                                                 
12 Note this game is an extension of the two person “norms game” described in Sethi 
[1996], which in turn is based on Axelrod [1984].  See also Binmore and Samuelson [1994] 
and Gueth and Kliemt [1993]. and one could argue that social reciprocity exists to the extent that strategies 4 
and/or 5 survive under this (or similar) selection mechanisms. 
  Intuition suggests that the expected payoffs of (2) through (5) should be 



























Are there any circumstances under which social reciprocity survives?  
Because free riders will sometimes do much worse than punishers: 
 
 
  11 2 3 4 27.5 22.5 60 40 20 p ppp π =+ + + +  
 
social reciprocity may evolve from certain initial conditions.  Figure 5 illustrates 
the evolution of behavioral types from the initial state in which 40% of the 
population are free riders and the remaining strategies each comprise 15% of the 
population.  In this case there are too many free riders for punishment to take 
hold and despite the second order free riders initially doing well by free riding on 
the punishers, free riders eventually take over the population. 
  In a balanced initial population, however, the four contributing types 
expect  π2=67.5,  π3=65.5,  π4=63.5, and π5=62.5, and free riders expect just 
π1=56.  The mean payoff for the entire population is  63 π = , which means that 
free riders and social reciprocators will fall short of the population mean, and see 
their numbers diminish, but the shares of the three other types of contributors 
will rise.  The surprise, perhaps, is that from this initial state, numerical 
calculation of the replicator dynamic reveals that the free riders and not the 
social reciprocators, will be driven to extinction.  The evolution of social 
reciprocity from balanced initial conditions is shown in figure 6. 
 Figures 5 & 6 here 
 
  A second important fact is illustrated in figure 6.  Not only do social 
reciprocators survive selection in a balanced population, so do strong 
reciprocators and second order free riders.  Perhaps one of the most interesting 
results of this model is that it predicts a polymorphism of contributing strategies 
and this polymorphism is, more or less, what we see in the lab.  In our 
experiment, about a third of the participants consistently punish both outside 
and inside their groups, about half punish ingroup only, and the remaining 20% 




Norm-based reciprocal explanations of punishment explain behavioral data better 
than the Price et al. [forthcoming] theory in which punishment evolves to reduce 
the differential benefit accrued by free riders.  Specifically, we have shown that 
the Gintis [2000] theory of strong reciprocity can better explain punishment 
within groups, and a generalization of this theory, which we call, social 
reciprocity can explain why punishment might occur both within and across 
groups.  Painting in broad strokes, understanding punishment and social 
reciprocity, in particular, is important because it provides the theoretical 
foundations to answer the puzzle of how cooperation can evolve and be sustained 
in large scale populations with fuzzy boundaries, like neighborhoods.  Another set 
of data from neighborhoods in Chicago illustrates the phenomenon we wish to 
understand.  Sampson et al. [1997] show that collective efficacy, their term for 
monitoring and punishing rule breakers locally, is a significant predictor of 
neighborhood-level outcomes.  We claim that such a result can only be 
understood if we allow for social reciprocators who punish free riders 
indiscriminately. 
  








Figure 1 - Who is Punished in the Mutual Monitoring Game?  
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Figure 3 - Behavior in the Social Reciprocity Game  
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Figure 5 – The Simulated Dynamic with an Unbalanced Initial Population  
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Figure 6 – The Simulated Dynamic from Balanced Initial Conditions References 
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